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G. Wesley Houp 
Affidavit of the Woman Who 
Jumped f ram Clay's Ferry Bridge 
I laid low for the first week and surfaced 
only once or twice the second. After 
sixteen days in the water, I came up, 
and now the fisherman who greeted me 
shits his pants every time he thinks 
of crappie fishing at the mouth of Dix River. 
You see, I was hung up in a deadfall 
on the downstream side of the confluence. 
He told the authorities that he saw me, 
reached out, then I came right out of my skin. 
But the truth is that I came up exhausted 
and held out a hand. The bastard spooked 
and left me half naked, consumed, 
just like every other man I've ever known. 
So I let my body dissolve in backwater 
where two rivers meet, where I'm 
occasionally kissed by small fish and where, 
beneath the calm surface, heavy, dark, 
vague, nightmarish things pass close by. 
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(3 December 2002) 
C> 2003 dlsClosure: a journal 
of social theory no. 12. 
Committee on Social Theory, 
University of Kentucky, 
Lexington, KY 
Jeffrey C. Alexander is professor and Chair of 
the Sociology Department at Yale University. Ile 
has written extensively in social theory. Ilis books 
Theoretical Logic i11 Sociology (1982-83), T1venty Lec-
l11res: Sociological Theory Since 1'17orld l't7ar Two (1987), 
Aclio11 a11d Its E11viro111ne11ls: To111ards a New Sy11the.ris 
(1988), and Fi11 de siecle Social Theory: Refalivis111
1 
Re-
d11ctio11, a11d the Proble111 of Reaso11 (1995) arc essential 
to understanding contemporary theoretical debates 
within sociology. Alexander's cultural sociology has 
had a great impact. J Tis call for the autonomous 
sta tus of culture in sociological analysis has been 
quite influential, as sociologists are theorizing cul-
ture in new and necessary ways. In his new book, 
Alexander develops a theory of the civil sphere 
emphasizing the role of culture in shaping the 
structures of our political life. 
Alexander was invited as the 2002 l"all Distin-
guished Author in Social Theory by the Committee 
on ocial Theory at the University of Kentucky. 
During his visit, Alexander delivered two talks en-
titled "Theorizing the Possibilities of Justice: The 
Split Life of the Civil phere" and "Civil ociety 
and the American Civil Rights Movement." After-
wards, disCloS11re had the opportunity to discuss 
these talks and his new manuscript with him. 
disClosure: You arc just now completing a book 
on civil society. Could you discuss the origins of 
this project and situate your argument within re-
cent studies of civil society? 
Jeffrey Alexander: T his book comes out of the 
experiences 1 had in the 1980's. I laving come back 
from China in 1989, I realized there was a small 
body of literature that was developing about civil 
society and that there had been a transformation 
of Marxism into a kind of radical democratic 
theory. It coincided with my own interests in civil 
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society that went back to the 1970's, which were stimulated by my interest in the 
Watergate crisis, by my interest in Durkheim, G ramsci, and by Parsons's concept 
of the societal community. All of these interests and backgrounds came together, 
and I began working on this project. 
dC: You mentioned an intellectual movement on the Left from Marxism to more 
radical democratic approaches to social and political theory. I wonder if you could 
comment on how this has played out at the level of local and national politics in 
the United States. Criticisms of the recent elections and the failure of the Demo-
crats to retain power in the house, focus on the inability of the Democrats to de-
velop a specific, or distinctive, agenda or platform that would appeal to a number 
of voters. According to these arguments, we do 1101 have the kinds of options that 
individuals really want There seems to be, on the part of many citizens, a call for 
a~other option as far as political parties and leaders go, but we arc not being pro-
vided one. Thjs seems to indicate a lack of parallelism between theory and prac-
tice. How might we account for this? 
JA: I think that the crisis of liberal or leftist ideologies creates various results. One 
i~ .the movement towards democracy as the normative framework for a lot of po-
littcal theory: there has been a revival of democratic theory in the last ten or fif-
teen years-even moving away from distributive issues as they were articulated in 
Rawls's work. 
Anot.her re.suit is that the critique of capitalism by sociaHsm no longer carries sub-
stantial weight, because the alternative of socialism in a strong sense, which is a 
non-market, state-directed organization of production and distribution, is basi-
c~~ not th~ught of as viable now. So, that has presented the Left with this giant 
cnsis of social democracy. Leninism and Maoism have virtually disappeared. This 
creates a real challenge for the European and the American Left which is how to 
work out a critical alternative to conservatism. The problem i; that the leaders 
want to embrace the market, but they do not want to be conservative. So, they dc-
vel?p what's call~d the "new labor" in England, new forms of social democracy in 
~hina a~d eve.n ~ France. Even in Spain, they arc all very market-oriented social-
ists. I think this is a bi~ ?roblem. The Democratic Party has problems, but J think 
that th.e m?ve from c~ittcal theory towards radical democracy is a good move that 
coul~ insp1rc a new kind of liberalism in the United States because radical democ-
racy 1s more part of the republican tradition in the United States; radical democ-
racy does not come from as far outside of this tradition. 
dC: I won?er if this disaffection with the Democratic Party will create or 
strengthen in ~ny way some part of the civil sphere? Will the civil sphere be 
strengthened, 1f our regulatory institution or the State isn' t pc c · 
th. k · h Id? rLorming as we 10 1t S OU 
JA: I do not work with--and necessarily I do not accept the d' b. · f s . . . - 1s nct1on o tatc 
and civil society. I have written a criticism of that as a ~: · f . conunuation o seven-
teenth- and eigh~ecnth-~e~tury poJjtical theory. I have called it Civil Society I in 
my new manuscript. T his is a perspective that has been embraced b · , 
f · il · y various pro-ponents o civ society from the mid-1970s when th b b . . , c concept egan to e re-
vived in Poland by Lcszek Kolakowski and Adam Michni'k B t T h' k h' · . u t in t 1s notion 
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suggests that all associations that arc not state-directed arc civil society associa-
tions. Viictor Pcircz-Diiaz embraces that and articulates that in Spain, and his 
work has been very influential. 
I see that this framework is useful in struggles against totalitarian or authoritarian 
societies because those societies try to repress autonomous associations. This per-
spective of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theory has been reproduced and 
brought back to contemporary consciousness because of the movements against 
communism and authoritarianism. But once you have the transition, I personally 
do not believe that this perspective is a very helpful understanding of civil society 
or the civil sphere. Today, this could be called a neo-Tocquevillean approach to 
civil society, and it has been brought to its highest level in American social science 
by Robert Putnam, in his book Bo1vli11g A/011e and in his first book on democracy. 
This approach is not very helpful because it docs not have a strong normative 
traction, and it docs not have a strong empirical traction. In the spheres outside of 
the state, there arc so many different kinds of groups, systems, fields, spheres of 
justice, that it seems unproductive to lump them together in the concept of a civil 
society. This approach would put together under the same rubric a capitalist cor-
poration and a crusading social movement against capitalism, both being civil so-
ciety organizations. 1 <lo not find that very helpful, though I agree that the 
distinction between state and non-state is an important one. I am more interested 
in developing a theory of the civil sphere that is tied to more differentiated and 
specific moral criteria and cultural and political processes whjch would lead to a 
kind of f Tabcrmasian idea. But I have a lot of criticisms of the Ilabermasian posi-
tion. 
dC: l n your new manuscript, you propose three categories of Civil ociety--Civil 
Society I, TT, and 111. l t seems Civil Society 111 is a dialectical result of aspects of 
both Civil ocicty T and Civil Society II. Civil Society T1T is a category that retains 
clements from both Civil Society T and Civil ocicty TI, namely the positive as-
pects of both: the moral and ethical endowment of Civil ocicty I and the differ-
entiation of Civil Society TI resisting the identification of society with the 
market-
JA: And the negative aspects. Marx and Marxism identified civil society with self-
ishness, bourgeois society, individualism, and private property: I call that Civil o-
cicty IJ. 'The idea, then, was to abolish civil society. That had many ramifications. 
It seemed very hard to establish a democratic theory that we would find accept-
able today, if you had the idea that civil society would be abolished because that 
partly suggested the abolition of the distinction of private and public; it sug-
gested a Rousscaucan General Will; it suggested that property should be con-
trolled by the public and perhaps by the State. 
But I do not think that the response to the problems of this kind of classical 
Marxist view should be to go back to a traditionally liberal theory of Civil ocicty 
1, which is very popular ideologically today in the United tates. President Clinton 
gave a commencement address at UCLA a few years ago (20 May 1994) in which 
he discussed what he called the "discourse of civil society." There is such a strong 
argument that the market and democracy always go together and there is no ten-
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sion between them. But there is a tension between the market and the civil sphere, 
as I have defined it. So, I think what is important is that if you look at Marx in a 
different way, he had in mind a utopian vision of a solidaristic community that did 
not give enough attention to autonomy. I would say it gave exaggerated emphasis 
on community. But he was aware of the problems of capitalism, and I think that 
the tension between capitalism and the civil sphere is an endemic one which will 
be ongoing. 
I have this three-part notion of the three kinds of boundary relations between the 
civil and non-civil spheres, which can be conceptualized as facilitating input. Let's 
take the economy and the civil sphere. You can argue that markets and private 
property help to produce the freedom of the civil sphere because they underpin 
notions of autonomy: they encourage senses of responsibility, etc. They can also 
be thought of as providing material goods that allow self-expression-there arc 
many arguments that proceed in this manner. I would not wish to deny that there 
are, but a conservative position would emphasize exclusively the facilitating inputs 
from the private economy to the civil sphere. I would want to say that there arc 
also destructive intrusions, such that the relations of the private market under-
mine to certain degrees and in certain ways the promise of respectful and recipro-
cal relationships of the civil sphere. They do so not by really producing inequality, 
but by allowing inequality to be transferred into differential respect and power in 
public and civil life. So, that is why I am trying to think of the third civil society as 
different from the first two, but it is as you say a kind of dialectical synthesis of 
some aspects of that. 
dC: In your manuscript you say that the civil society concept has been "secular-
ized." Secularization is usually understood as the process by which what was once 
sacred loses this quality. What are the theoretical implications of saying that the 
civil society concept is now entering the secularized realm of social theory? 
JA: What I meant by "secularization" was really in the context of the idea of the 
relation of social movements to social science. I wanted to say that most of the 
important concepts in social science, which arc treated today in a mundane way in 
the sense that they are treated as objects of analysis, conceptualization, and em-
pirical and theoretical research, were once highly contested sacred things in social 
life. They still are to some degree. You can think of it as routinization if you want, 
rather than movement from religious to secular: it is a metaphor. So, class docs 
not arouse a great many social movements today, but it is an interesting concept in 
social science. ~he same with race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, poverty. 
We have to realize that these concepts that moved into social science did so for 
political and m~ral reasons .. Then they became secularized in the metaphorical 
sense of bccomtng less emotionally laden for many people, though the normative 
references of these concepts arc still there, and people, I think, care about them in 
a moral and political sense, and that is why we study them. 
But you raise an interesting point, which I worried about when J wrote that phrase 
and when I re-read that phrase last year when I was editing the boo k. I do not 
want to suggest that civil society is not a sacred concept. The way J understand it 
civil society is part of the discourse of the sacred and the profane: it s till inspire: 
36 
dC interviews Jeffrey C. Alexander 
intense symbolic behavior in contemporary societies. But for the sociologist or the 
social scientist, we need always to step back as far as we can and have a more de-
tached relationship to the concepts we use. So, what I am recommending is that 
the time has come to create a complex, sociological theory of civil society; to cre-
ate such a theory has been difficult because the concept has been so highly con-
tested, and that it still is difficult but possible to begin to subject civil society to 
this kind of analysis. 
And I do think that in real life, civil society still is an object of sacrality as subject 
to ritualization. I use late Durkheimian theory in my new book, as I have been de-
veloping it over the years, especially in terms of the discourse of the sacred and 
profane. To me, it is very important to attach Durkheim to semiotics to develop 
the sense in which the binary oppositions of civil society provide a basis for 
stigma and shame, anc.I that sets up a framework of exclusion-to legitimate 
forms of exclusion. One of the core arguments of my book is that exclusions arc 
generally legitimate with the core group and that the members of a core group arc 
not excluding people only on the basis of their power to exclude people. They also 
exclude people because insofar as they arc engaged in a project of modernization 
or democracy, they exclude because they feel endangered by the pollution of cat-
egories of people whom they have constructed as dangerous to the project of 
civil society. So that to come back into, or to come into, the civil sphere requires a 
symbolic purification on the part of dominated groups, both in terms of their 
own self-image at times but, more importantly, in terms of their framing by core 
groups. 
dC: So, it is the responsibility of the dominated group, the marginalized, to make 
the core group sec them in a different light? 
JA: T would not say that it is their responsibility in a moral sense. If we talk about 
a moral responsibility, then 1 would say it is the responsibility of the core group to 
include the outer group. Sociologically, social movements that are launched by 
marginalized groups do not only try to gain power but they also try to gain legiti-
macy. And one way that they do so--and the most important way-is by re-fram-
ing their identities. A lot of political conflict in a quasi-democratic society is a 
process of influence and persuasion. It is 1101 a matter of force. In that sense, my 
theory is related to deliberative theories of democratic discourse. I am kind of 
translating the notion that there is a discourse ethics and that democracy is based 
on discourse into cultural, sociological idiom. I want to argue that I agree that po-
litical conflicts have a strongly discursive character. From the perspective of cul-
tural sociology that I have developed, I am more pessimistic about the concept of 
rationality. T sec reasonableness as a cultural category that has structural status 
rather than an immanent quality of discourse itself. That suggests a different atti-
tude. Jn order to be effective, the dissident movement has to be very clever in a 
pcrformativc sense about framing its own demands and indeed its own identities 
as legitimate in terms of the discourse of civil society. 
dC: 1 want to push this deliberative model a little bit further. In your talk earlier 
today, you claimed that social movements seek persuasion and not merely power. 
'They want to acquire persuasion communicatively to give rise to a moral outrage 
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in civil society: you talked about Birmingham trying to elicit moral outrage from 
northern civil society. That moral outrage, in turn, sets in motion regulatory inter-
vention, culminating in civil repair. This process mirrors in many relevant respects 
Habermas's two-track model of deliberative politics developed and elaborated in 
BetJveen Facts and Norms. There, Habermas refers to the "constitutionally legitimate 
circulation of power'' where people in civil society attempt to influence the 
agenda of parliament or congress. What this ultimately gives rise to is rational law, 
which seems to be what is going on in at least this instantiation of the process of 
civil repair. If your model is that similar to I Iabcrmas's, where is the distinction 
between his model and yours? You mentioned earlier that you have criticisms of 
Habermas? How is your model superior to, or at least better than, I Iabermas's? 
JA: I have a kind of hero worshipping attitude towards I Iabcrmas, and that makes 
him one of the living people for whom I still have a kind of boyish admiration 
and enthusiasm, both in his private life and as a philosopher. I am very enthusias-
tic about Habermas. At the same time, my work has been inspired by l Tabermas in 
many respects, and I have always been in a kind of productive dialogue with him 
from my point of view, as many people have been, of course. I have had a lot of 
problems with I Iabermas's rationalism, and I have articulated this in various ways. 
The first problem: What is speech and what is language? This goes back to his 
emphasis on speech in terms of pragmatics, and my feeling is that--and T said this 
in my article "Ilabermas and Critical Theory: Beyond the Marxian Dilemma?" 
which was reproduced in the Ilonncth and Joas edition on If abcrmas back in 
1991-this pragmatics of the speech act arc insufficiently sensitive to the takcn-
for-grantcd cultural presuppositions of language. This goes back to Saussure's dis-
tinction between speech and language. I am very interested in the language itself. 
For me, IIabermas has tried to develop the notion that the reciprocity and the 
norms of deliberation-in terms of transparency and respcct--and the commit-
ment to seeking the truth come out of the speech situation itself. T mean that is 
one of his several moves, a kind of post-Kantian move; whereas in my work T 
have tried to argue that the standards of reasonableness precede the speech act and 
are embodied in discourses. 
My. understanclin~ of disc.o.urses comes from semiotics and poststructuralism, 
which Habermas is very cntical of and is critical of for a number of reasons that 
se~m to be both good and bad. This has been articulated in his critique of French 
t:11IDk.er~. Ile conn.ccts an :mphasis on the structuredness of discourses, the prc-
lingu1stic structunng of discourses, to Heidegger, to the conservative Romantic 
traditions, to Gadamer, and to the notion of tradition itself. And so for f Iabcrmas 
it has been very difficult to accept the given constraints on speech. f Tc is turning 
to pragmatics and has turned away from the German and the J•'rench in some dc-
gre~ towa~ds an American and pragmatist understanding, even though he's sti ll 
odbv1?usly m the German tradition of this. J don't think that is sociologically pro-
uctive. 
Now, in his work on the weak and strong publics-in fact in Facts a1Jd Norms-he 
does have a very interesting socioloo1cal theory that 1·s 1·n · • . .e>- many respects quite 
complementary or consistent with mme. I was surprised to read that, even though 
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I had seen signs of it coming, like in the Postscript to Haber1J1as and The P11blic 
Sphere, his references to public opinion, to culture. I have seen this gigantic trans-
formation of I Iabcrmas from the 1960s work on the transformation of the public 
sphere, where public opinion is sharply criticized as manipulated by capitalism, to 
a later understanding that public opinion is a positive resource often and is a way 
of working through issues in deliberation. My only real criticism of that part of 
his work is that the concept of meaning and culture should be brought into that 
more strongly, that the understanding of how movements and intellectuals and 
others stimulate and criticize opinion in the weak publics has to be more elabo-
rated in the way that I have described. And I don't necessarily think, at least in a 
country like the United States, that the Parliament is the strong public. Maybe 
more on the Continent and in places with a strong party, like in Germany or 
maybe in England, 1 can sec privileging the Parliament. I would simply say the Par-
liament is a more regulated institution in that it articulates law, which is a different, 
very fundamental dimension of the civil sphere. I think that the communicative 
institutions that he is increasingly interested in arc equally important; I do not 
think that they arc weak, they arc just not regulatory. They are much more plastic, 
of course. 
dC: I would like to ask you about another intellectual whose work you have dis-
cussed previously, Pierre Bourdicu. Jn your book Fi11 de Siecle Social Theory, you 
seem to argue that there is a problematic relationship between structure and 
agency in Bourdicu's work. What is your opinion of the Bourdieuian concept of 
habit11s in relation with this problematic relationship between structure and 
agency? Is the dichotomy of structure and agency still useful in social science? In 
other words, can social scientists do without this dichotomy? 
JA: Well, T have written a lot about this. To recapitulate what l have written, I 
think that for Bourdieu, habit11s is the equivalent of the self. I Tc develops the idea 
of habi/11s as an internalization of social structure, so that the person is able to act 
as a carrier of status and class and some structures. That is an interesting idea be-
cause it allows him to put a great deal of emphasis on the actor and not simply 
objective structures coercing people. lie secs that the habit11s is a central element in 
the sense of social structure, but that it also has a subjective status. 
My problem with that is precisely his insistence on the isomorphism or the paral-
lelism between self and social structure, which means that he docs not sec the self 
in a modern society as having independence, or autonomy, vis-ti-vis social structure. 
1 would say, following a sociological tradition of Weber and Durkheim and Par-
sons, but also somebody like G. r I. Mead, or even modern-day developmental psy-
chology, like Piaget, or I 1reudian psychoanalytic psychology, that one of the most 
distinctive qualities of modern life is that the self-while a social product-has 
developed the capacity for detachment and criticism, so that a fully socialized per-
son is usually a person who is self-critical and critical of society. Bourdieu's notion 
of habit11s suggests an overly socialized actor who reproduces social structure 
without knowing it. Of course, reproduction is common and is an important di-
mension, but 1 think that there is much more going on with the self than he 
thinks. 
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dC: And the dichotomy between structure and agency is still useful for social 
theory? Is it still necessary to try to dismantle or criticize this dichotomy? 
JA: As long as there is going to be social theory, there arc always going to be con-
flicts over emphasis on structures and the emphasis on actors. It is a prominent 
philosophical preoccupation, and it is part of modern and democratic social 
structures that is a reflection of the emphasis on trying to provide legal guarantees 
for freedom of expression as against social pressures. But I do not think that it is 
properly conceptualized. I never have. I have always written against the dichotomy 
of structure and agency. I have tried to work out various alternative formulations. 
I think that the last time I did this at length was in the last chapter of a 1998 book 
called Neofi111ctio11alistn a11d After and also in my essay "The Reality of Reduction: 
The Failed Synthesis of Pierre Bourdieu" (Chapter 4) in Fi11 de Sitcle S orial Theory. 
The problem is that an actor is not the same as an agent, that actors have agency, 
they have freedom. There is free will; actors have autonomy. But the real capacity 
for freedom comes from the socialized capacity to exercise self-control and to de-
velop a moral standard. So, if we are looking for the resources for critical re-
sponses to social structure, whether it is a patriarchy or a class structure or 
religious structure, I am not convinced that we need to turn to theories of radical 
agency that are anti-structural. What we need to understand, rather, is how the 
personalities, or the selves of actors, are produced culturally and socially in ways 
that give people a sense of their cultural capacities for criticism. That is very im-
portant from the contemporary point of view. So, an actor who is fully apart from 
social structure is exercising agency in the sense of freedom and criticism. 
dC: I was interested in what you said earlier today in your talk about the ideas of 
performance and melodrama as they relate to the civil rights movement. ln that 
example it seems that the media, journalists, played a particular role in bringing 
tha.t ?ra~a to an audience. The media was necessary for the uptake of civil rights 
acbv~sts performance as the weak, oppressed victim confronting the uncivil, 
donunant oppressor. That was forty years ago. Now we want to think about that 
occurring on a global level. Ilow, given the changes public media has undergone in 
the four decades, would it be possible for the media to play that kind of role-es-
pecially ~the US, where the media that we arc so often confronted with is corpo-
rat~ :°1edia? ~ven though we have alternative news sources-independent and 
politically radical web sources, for instance- these arc not as visually pervasive 
and accessible as say something like CNN. 
JA: Yes, that.is som.cthing that I am concerned about. The thing I want to stress is 
that the media was JUSt as corporate then as now. The mass media can have diffcr-
~nt economic bases; it c~uld be a nonprofit but government agency like the BBC; 
1t could be a profit-making company like the New York Times. Jn either case, it 
c.an also be ~oo~ed on as a co.mmunicativc institution of civil society. An institu-
oon can be m different domains at the same time. So, just because a news outlet 
or even people who run Saturday night sitcoms, need to and want to make ~ 
profit, it doesn't mean. that they only serve themselves or the needs of capital. Al-
though there are conflicts between profit making and the public 1· t t · · n eres m vanous 
ways, what we see in newspapers and in television news arc two factors which al -
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low them to also function as institutions of the civil sphere. 
One is journalism as profession, and in the last fifty to seventy-five years there's 
been an increasing professionalization of the journalist's role. This has been 
widely written about, so that if you go back a hundred years or a hundred and fifty 
years, you would sec no distinction between editorial and news, for example, in 
newspapers. You would barely see distinctions between advertising and news re-
porting. Even though I have written about and believed that news itself is a form 
of narration- it's not an objective recounting of events-nonetheless, there's a 
lot of sense of the autonomy of the journalist and there are continuous tensions, 
therefore, between journalism and management in terms of the pressures. So, 
whenever there's a buying out of a newspaper or efforts to bring together media 
and 'IV in a single outlet, there arc a lot of protests and a lot of conflicts about 
whether that would undermine the integrity and the autonomy of the journalist. 
What is journalism and news reporting? It is an interpretation of an event from 
the point of view of public opinion. The public opinion is not homogeneous; it is 
fragmented, and sometimes it is polarized. lt is certainly different if it is liberal, 
conservative, and there arc other divisions that sometimes arc relevant. But, that 
to me is the primary framing clement, 1101 the profit-making nature of the com-
pany that the journalist works for, except in certain issues. 
So, today, if we arc thinking about news reporting, I think the corporate nature of 
the news is a constant; I do not think it is varied. I mean, there are larger compa-
nies, and if I am thinking of CNN and how it reports news, I think its main 
source of bias is that it is an American company, not a capitalist one. It is a sad 
thing that in the world that the only worldwide source of news in most of the 
countries of the world is an American news company. And it is very strange in-
deed. 
I think that there is a growing conservatism among journalists today, and the news 
media reflects an ideological turn towards at least the center and the Right in the 
society. f'or the first time in the U , we have Pox news, which is an overtly conser-
vative network, and we have a weakness of critical liberalism as an ideology. This 
is reflected in the ability of Bush to seduce journalists to accept his point of view. 
But that seduction is structured in the very differentiation of society. To the de-
gree that the civil sphere is autonomous, to that degree every person who holds 
power would try to seduce it. A liberal or a leftist has to seduce the news media 
and so docs a rightist. Kennedy, Roosevelt, they were all famously seductive to-
wards the media, and they tried to control the independence of the public sphere, 
and make it their own. 
I think one way to seduce, to most effectively win, the media is to mount an effec-
tive performance to the American public and to the people who stand for the 
public, which arc the journalists and the editors of the media. It is not a matter of 
corporate money controlling the interpretation of journalists and audiences. 
Rather, it is a matter of conservative dramaturgy seeming convincing and persua-
sive in a competitive field to, if not journalists, then large sections of audiences. 
So, the reason why performance is critical is because of the differentiation and 
distance of citizens from poli tical actors, which is a product of a complex society. 
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There is no way that any of us will ever closely observe a politician, I have never 
seen them personally. I am sure most people have not Everything is mediated 
through media of mass communication. Therefore, it is inevitable that the actions 
of those who want to be persuasive to a public will have a pcrformative quality. It 
does not mean that that is an inauthentic or deceptive action in a moral sense. 
This is a pretty complicated question, the relationship between authenticity, per-
formance, honesty, and integrity. 
dC: What you have just said is relevant to the distinction that you make in your 
recent work between cognitive and expressive media. This distinction seems 
somewhat arbitrary, especially if we take into account the expressive aspects of 
cognitive media contents. Do you think we could question the distinction between 
cognitive and expressive media? 
JA: Yes, we can. I wanted to imply the distinction mainly to distinguish between 
media that presents itself as merely factual and concentrated in information, and 
the media that explicitly presents itself as non-informational, as in the little para-
graph at the end of movies saying, any relationship between the characters and 
events in this movie and real life are purely coincidental. Whereas in news report-
ing, they say that they are referring to real events. But, my point in the book, and 
in other things I have written about the media, is that news reporting is causal rep-
resentation and is guided by narrative and semiotic considerations. Most good sto-
ries tell a narrative, in fact, they are called stories; they arc not just reports. They 
have protagonists; they have antagonists; they have a sense of what the dangers 
are. And they identify and help to crystallize powerful symbols. So, I agree with 
you that cognitive media have strong expressive aspects. At the same time, expres-
sive media have strong moral implications. I wanted to draw on some work in the 
humanities to talk about the moral contents of fiction. I think it is very important 
that societies work through a lot of their political concerns in terms of simple 
dramas that are broadcastcd in movies and television or in pulp fiction of various 
kinds. 
dC: You made a claim yesterday that theorizing justice suffers from trying to keep 
the universal and the particular separate, I guess too separate. And you want to sec 
universalism more concretely, and I think that the vehicle for that is the discourse 
of civil society, which is structured in binary oppositions at three levels between 
persons, interactions, and institutions. Could you elaborate the discourse of civil 
society itself in the context of how this is going to concretize universalism? 
JA: If you read Rawls, Habermas, Dworkin, or the more classical philosophers 
before them, you see a continuous reference to the word "reason," to the term 
"rationality," and to the concept of "universals." And these references arc them-
selves offered sometimes as evaluative criterion to judge action and moral judg-
ment, or sometimes simply operationalized in terms of different kinds of 
procedures which will allow people to judge rationality or universaHsm. The way J 
see cultural sociology is not to say that people arc irrational in the sense that they 
don't pursue necessarily universalistic ideals. I think people do try to be universal-
istic in their judgments and that they do try to be rational. But what I wanted to 
emphasize is that rationality is carried by concrete symbols and by concrete Ian-
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guagcs. So, in the case of the discourse of civil society pcop~c are ca~ght ~nsi~e of 
the language game, in which there arc fairly rigid sets o~ dich~to~es, like md~­
penden t/ dependcn t, open/ close, honest/ dishonest, rattonal/ trratton.al. That JS 
what I meant by more concrete. It is a set of words that actually occu~ m eve~y~ay 
speech. You can sec it at all levels of the society. I conclude from this ~at Jt 1~ a 
very accessible and intuitively understood set of concepts that have thetr own in-
ternal organization that are used. That is what I mean by more concrete, and not 
abstract. I do not think people strive to be rational actors. They want to see them-
selves symbolically in terms of values. They want to avoid pollution and stigma~­
zation, and they want to have a sense of purity and charismatic power. I am still 
speaking here strictly in terms of the codes. of ci~il ~ociety. These te~ms-sacred 
and profane--arc articulated in terms of this sem1ottc structure o.f discourse. ~ut 
further than that, these words themselves arc often understood m terms of im-
ages and stories, which in I Tabermas's sense arc part of the li fc:-Vorld and th~ ethi-
cal sphere. By trying to live up to, or live out, or make your !J~c parallel with an 
admired social narrative, that is how people would act democratically, not because 
they have the capacity for rational action in the sense that I Iabermas describes it. I 
told this to J f abcrmas, and he said, you arc not making a philosophical argument, 
and that he was not making a sociological argument. I said, that is true. So, I am not 
sure how these really relate to each other, but I sec these as the alternatives. It 
could be considered a sociological translation of the concerns of discourse ethics, 
or it could be considered an alternative sociology to a discourse ethics. 
dC: To your mind, I Iabcrmas, and maybe even Rawls, privileges ~easo~ too m~ch 
such that it is disconnected from culture. You maintain that what JS rational actton 
is itself coded by a given culture, usually the culture that is dominant. lPe act this 
way, so this is always going to be on the positive side of the binary divide, and any-
one who is not like 11s is going to be ostracized and rendered impure. Arc not 
I Iabermas, Rawls, and other philosophers trying to preserve rationality and rea-
sonableness so that it doesn't get that cultural tinge because such an admixture 
creates a lot of problems? 
JA: J would say that you have to find some ground between, on the one hand, a 
purely relativistic position that would say, sociologically, anything can ?e und~r the 
guise of rationality or reason and, on the other hand, a pur:ly philos~p~tcally 
grounded argument for the universality of rcason~blcn~ss. I th1~k that w1th~n the 
IJabermasian tradition there is a reaching toward discursive practices and delibera-
tion as generating, in an imminent sense, the commitments and standards of ra-
tional action. 
There arc probably two sources of the discourse of civil society. Pir.st, not all so-
cieties arc committed to rationality. 'fhat is a relatively modern, rclattvely Western 
kind of conception. lt involves associated ideas about autonomy and individuality. 
1t is not an ideal of many other civilizations in history. So, that is relatively recent, 
and relatively specific, although it is spread out all over the world. One source of 
the concern with rationality is certain cultural-political traditions that date back to 
Western traditions: Greece, Judaism, Christianity, Roman law, medieval constitu-
tional ism and parliamentarism, civic republicanism, socialism, scientific revolu-
tion. A ll these movements have made commitments to certain ideals of autonomy 
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and rationality in their own ways. They have made deposits in the bank of Western 
culture, as it were. I believe that in non-Western cultures there arc also equivalents 
of these. I think Islam has it in its renaissance times, and I Iinduism and Buddhism 
also have parallel conceptions, but I am not competent to make observations 
about those societies. 
But the other thing, and this is more of a Ilabermasian move, is that if you set up 
a thought experiment and you say, "what are the requirements of self-governing 
collectivity?" and "what would be the kinds of people that would have to occupy 
that so that they would not be subjugated to power or coercion?" I think you 
would come up with a lot of the positive sides of the discourse of civil society. 
People need to be honest; they need to be autonomous; they need to be coopera-
tive. Because if they were not that, then why would we want to protect freedom 
of speech, why give people so much autonomy? We would want to have surveil-
lance over them and to control them, which is what we do when we put people in 
jail. We have young children who cannot control themselves and arc closely super-
vised. In that sense, I think that a lot of these politics grow out of some kind of 
imp~cit thinking about what the requirements of self-regulation arc. I suppose 
that is parallel to 1 Iabermas's notions of the ethics that arc immanent to discourse. 
But they are not exactly the same. 
d~: I just wa~t to be clear~ earlier you said that this discourse of civil society or 
this demo~rallc language 1s often seen as images. Arc you referring to these 
groups secmg themselves symbolically in terms of these values? 
JA: Yes, in a performative sense. So, let us say we arc trying to think about Jesse 
Jackson. Jesse Jackson or Al Sharpton-even more clearly-makes certain com-
men~ or gives a speech. The speech is reproduced in the newspapers and in the 
m~dia, and people talk about it. Arc these people employing purely rational cvalu~ 
attve standards? The people ask: "Is Al Sharpton a democratic leader or is he a 
demagogue?"; "Is he going to help the cause of dcmocrati%ation or is he a racist 
who ~s undermini.ng it?" It is h.ard to ~akc those evaluations without the image of 
M~ttn Luther King, Jr. The unage 10 the collective memory of Martin Luther 
King, Jr., what he embodies in a symbolic sense, is a regulating device to control 
and to gu_id.c our evaluations of Al Sharpton's speech. And that's the way the cul-
ture-as 1t 1s processed-works to propel ethical evaluations in public discourse. 
dC: You just mentioned collective memory. Could you comment on Maurice 
Halbwachs's concept of collective memory? 
JA: I think Halbwachs made a brilliant connection from late Durkhcimian sociol-
ogy to ~ notion .of memory and institutionalizing memory, monuments, and 
manuscripts. lle ~ntroduccd a. ~orion that has become very much an object of 
study and theory 10 the humanities and social sciences. 
dC: So, could this concept be used for doing cultural analysis? 
JA: Yes, of course, but there has been a lot of work that has referenced 
Halbwachs, a number of works in collective memory that I D kh · · . . . arc a so ur c1m1an, 
like somethmg tn Paul Connerton's book on memory I thi.nl th · . . · { ere arc two issues. 
One 1s the relation of collective memory to psychoanalysi 'l'h · b. · · s. at 1S a ig JSSUC m 
44 
dC interviews Jeffrey C. Alexander 
the humanities. Many people use psychoanalytic theories relating to trauma and 
memory, but I would be reluctant to use psychoanalysis for that. I would want to 
link it more to social and cultural processes. The other issue is the relation of the 
whole Durkheimian tradition to ideas. There is a separateness between Weber and 
Durkheim. Durkheim is interested in the social processes of religion. Ile was not 
interested in the history of ideas. Weber was interested in the history of ideas, and 
he wasn't that interested in developing an abstract theory of religion as Durkheim 
was. In terms of collective memory, we need to have a theory of ideas as well as 
processes. So, we need to have a theory of semiotics and discourses and perfor-
mance. 
dC: To follow up on the issue of collective memory, in your talk earlier today, I 
was disconcerted by a distinction I thought was being made between what was 
going on in the South in terms of race relations and what was going on in the 
North. At least it appeared that in your talk the North was being privileged in a 
way as a more civil place for black Americans as opposed to the South. Por me 
that charactcri%ation rcinscribcs the whole notion that we-as a society with a col-
lective memory- have of what race relations is and was, which by and large is still 
centered on what happened in the South in the 1960s. So, it is those images of 
Bull Connor ancl the water hoses that largely determine our perception of race re-
lations, of what racial oppression is. I wondered if you could comment on that. 
This focus on the South seems to ignore aJI the race riots in the North and other 
movements not centered on Martin Luther King, Jr. 
JA: I was aware of that as I was writing this. And, of course, one of the most no-
table and disconcerting and tragic aspects of Martin Luther King J r.'s life is that 
when he did move to the North in 1965 and until his death in 1968, he was over-
whelmed by the structures of racial domination and focused especially on the 
construction of the racial underclass in the inner cities of the United tatcs, the 
11orthern U nitcd States. f Tc found these much more impenetrable and difficult to 
develop guilt over as compared to those structures of Jim Crow in the outh. So, 
what to do with that? 
My focus was on how Jim Crow structures were overcome. In that sense the 
North did not have Jim Crow. They had a different kind of racial structure. There 
were definitely strong racial feelings, and it's possible that some of the successes 
of the civil rights movements were because of northerners. The civil rights move-
ment was compatible with racial feelings towards blacks. Most northerners did not 
have and don't have day-to-day experiences with black people that southerners did 
and often do today. So, it was possible that there was even an anti-southern an-
tagonism that fueled northerners' identification with the black civil rights move-
ments, and it is their willingness at some point eventually to come down against 
the white power structure in the South. That itself was probably facilitated by ste-
reotypes about southern whites in the sense of the difference of northern whites, 
which was probably oversimplified. 
We arc aware today that the racial relations in the outh arc 1101 different from the 
North and vice-versa and some people make the argument that they arc better in 
some southern cities than in northern cities. There arc so many challenges of ra-
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cial relationships today; these problems of racializcd perceptions and of the 
underclass have remained and have posed problems and challenges that arc con-
tinuing. Society has dealt with racism in interesting ways in the last fifty years: pro-
gressive people talked about multiculturilism and tried to find ways of embracing 
racial difference rather than homogenizing the races. Even someone like Martin 
Luther King Jr. was looking towards a colorblind society. What's interesting is that 
difference is more important, more accepted, today as a normative gtildcline to 
racial relationships than colorblindness. 
Yet, the problem with the racial underclass has not been effectively addressed. 
And one of the implications of my treatment would be that before any political-
or economic- or state-centered solutions to the underclass would develop there 
would have to be a social movement from the black population that would gener-
ate identification with the suffering and degradation of blacks in the underclass. 
And that identification would have to be established between whites and blacks. 
Otherwise what we have today is the sense that the people in the underclass arc 
polluted, that they don't deserve public attention, that the underclass is a place in 
which there is crime and drugs, that people bring this on themselves. This is rein-
forced by a number of developments like the internal stratification and residential 
mobility of working-, middle-, and upper-class blacks out of the underclass. So, 1 
do think that this suggests ways of dealing with those problems but it docs not 
articulate them once and for all. 
dC: I am wondering if the collective memory of the civil rights movement is 
somehow preventing the current underclass or representatives of the underclass 
to imagine performances that would have some kind of efficacy. 
JA: Some people would say that black leaders have not found a successful new 
ideology to cover this problem. They would further say that the notion of the Af-
rican American as purely a victim, which is sometimes promoted by would-be 
leaders of lower-class African Americans, is no longer as effective because there 
have been forty years of affirmative action and there is a great deal of mobility 
and success at many levels of the class structure for African Americans. 
There are no black social movements today; the only real movements arc still in 
the realm of Black NationaJism or the Nation of Islam. 'I'hcre no longer seems to 
be any of the social forces that existed in the black community for such a long 
time. Eventually there will be, and I'm curious to sec what kind of movements 
there will be. 
dC: In the first chapter of your book you say that "only by understanding the 
boundary relations between civil and uncivil spheres can we convert civil society 
from a normative into a real concept that can be studied." And then you make the 
further claim that "only by understanding civil society in this realistic manner can 
we develop a critical normative theory about the incompleteness of civil society." 
I think this is an interesting juxtaposition of passages, one leaving the work am-
biguous as to whether it is normative or descriptive or if it is both. Where would 
you put the emphasis? What would you like the reader to take from the book in 
terms of its emphasis on normativity or descriptive signs? 
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JA: T do not think that any social science is simply descriptive. Nor is it simply ex-
planatory. All my work from the early 1980s on has developed a post-positivist 
theoretical position that shows that. 
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